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Abstract 
Across many developing countries, the power sector persistently underperforms despite years of 
market reform efforts. India, where de facto responsibility for the power sector rests with 
subnational (state) governments, provides a useful laboratory to examine why. The state of West 
Bengal provides an example of public sector reform as an alternative to the so-called “World 
Bank template” for electricity liberalization, and a lens on the political preconditions for reform 
success. Drawing on 30 elite interviews in 2016 alongside comparative evidence from other 
Indian states, this article documents the reform design and assesses its success. West Bengal’s 
reforms aimed at internally strengthening the utility against political interference. The study finds 
that this reform model delivered initial performance among the best of any Indian utility, and that 
successful reforms in several other states were also more statist than often recognized. However, 
longer-term sustainability remains challenging. While weak rural lobbies had some effect, the 
study explains this trajectory as the result of the transition from one-party dominance to 
intensified party-political competition, a finding that resonates with evidence from other Indian 
states. In contrast to influential political theories developed in the Global North, this suggests 
that party-political competition does not make Indian politicians more likely to deliver public 
services, but rather leads to short-termism and political capture of utilities. Conversely, under 
some conditions one-party dominance can encourage longer-term reforms. The study thus 
assesses the promise and limits of public sector reforms as an alternative to liberalization, and 
suggests how electoral competition can influence development priorities in Indian states.  
 
                                                   
1 This research was supported by the Regulatory Assistance Project as part of a collaborative research 
project on electricity in India, “Mapping Power,” coordinated by the Centre for Policy Research, New 
Delhi (see http://www.cprindia.org/projects/mapping-power). I am grateful to Ranjit Bharvirkar, Navroz 
Dubash, and Sunila Kale as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and 
to Ashwini Swain for advice on quantitative data. This article also benefited from discussions at the 
Centre for Policy Research, especially with Jonathan Balls, Rohit Chandra, Siddarth Sareen, Zakaria 
Siddiqui, and Ashwini Swain. Their own rich analyses will appear in the collection Mapping Power, 
edited by Bharvirkar, Dubash, and Kale (under preparation). This article represents the views of the 
author alone, who also is responsible for accuracy of facts and interpretation. 
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• West Bengal developed a publicly owned alternative to the troubled global template for 
electricity liberalization 
• West Bengal’s reforms brought dramatic initial performance gains which then plateaued  
• The study explains this decline as the result of intensified party-political competition 
• This finding runs counter to Western predictions that party-political competition improves 
public service delivery 
• In Indian states one-party dominance has often encouraged power reforms, but not broader 




Access to reliable and affordable electricity is critical for virtually every dimension of economic 
and human development. Recognizing this, many developing countries have experimented with 
power sector liberalization in order to improve the efficiency of their struggling power sectors. In 
1991 the Government of India took the first steps towards electricity liberalization. Yet, although 
the following quarter-century of intermittent reforms brought dramatic surges in generation 
capacity and rural electrification, India’s electric power industry remains troubled. Voltage 
fluctuations and power outages are frequent, while 240 million Indians lack power altogether. An 
estimated quarter of all power generated continues to be lost, much of it to theft, worsening the 
sector’s already perilous finances. By 2011 power sector debt had reached 5 percent of India’s 
total GDP; in 2015 the central government announced a bailout program, the third since 2001. 
The liberalization process has similarly brought disappointments from Brazil (Tankha, 2009) to 
Uganda (Gore, 2017). Faced with persistent underperformance despite more than two decades of 
liberalization efforts, scholars and practitioners alike have begun to debate why power sector 
reforms have proven so difficult. 
 Electricity underperformance is not uniform across India, however. Constitutional 
responsibility for the crucial “last mile” of distribution to end consumers rests in the hands of 
India’s state governments.2 This arrangement has helped to create wide regional variations in 
                                                   
2  Electricity falls on the constitution’s “concurrent list” of subjects shared between the central and state 
governments. Long-term planning, key project approvals, and considerable generation and transmission capacity rest 
with New Delhi and its agencies. Distribution, and thus effective responsibility for much policy implementation, 
rests with the states.  
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power governance, and thereby opens up opportunities to use India’s federal system as a 
“laboratory” for subnational comparisons.3 In this vein, this article provides a comparative 
examination of the overlooked yet relatively successful case of electricity reforms in West 
Bengal, an eastern state of around 90 million people, lower-middle-income in Indian terms.4 
Based on 30 elite interviews carried out in 2016 in the state capital, Kolkata, alongside 
comparative evidence, it draws out key determinants of power reform success within India.  
 The dominant power reform prescription in India drew inspiration from the so-called 
“World Bank template” for electricity liberalization, as it came to be pejoratively labelled. 
Pioneered in England and Wales and disseminated internationally under the Bank’s aegis, this 
aimed to improve utility efficiency through institutional restructuring, the introduction of 
independent regulators, and the disciplining effects of market competition.5 In the 1990s and 
2000s several Indian states adopted elements of the template, as did many other governments in 
the Global South, and in 2003 a related conception of liberalizing reforms was enshrined 
nationally with the passage of the Electricity Act. The results have been mixed at best. In Asia, 
Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, a number of analysts have outlined the flaws and 
unforeseen consequences of electricity liberalization, arguing that power deregulation ill fits 
settings outside the affluent, energy-rich societies where it was pioneered (Xu, 2004; Dubash & 
Singh, 2005; Tankha, 2009; Gore, 2017). The template’s advocates maintain that this is the result 
of its incomplete application, often because “interest group pressures” inhibit reform (Joskow, 
2008, 39).  
 These diagnoses open up two sets of questions: on reform design and the reform process, 
especially the deeper political preconditions that can facilitate reform success. The first critique 
challenges the ability of power liberalization to bring performance gains in Indian settings. Are 
there more effective power reform designs? The second foregrounds the significance of “interest 
group pressures” and other political obstacles. What explains the successful initiation and 
sustainability of reforms in some Indian states but not others?  
 In combination with comparative material from other Indian states, the West Bengal case 
illuminates both these questions. In 2005 West Bengal initiated a distinctively gradualist mode of 
power reforms with continued public ownership. This study first uses West Bengal to 
demonstrate the promise and limits of public sector reforms as an alternative to liberalization. 
Over the last two decades the reform of public sector enterprises has gradually risen on the 
                                                   
3 On the value of the subnational comparative method, see Snyder (2001).  
4 In 2012–13 West Bengal’s per-capita gross state domestic product was roughly twice that of the poorest state, 
Bihar, and half that of the highest performer (outside Delhi), Maharashtra. Figures from Open Government Data 
Platform India, https://data.gov.in. 
5 For an overview, see Joskow (2008). Its advocates always denied that it should be treated as a rigid ‘template’, 
though its application often resembled this in practice.  
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international development agenda, accounting for a small but increasing percentage of World 
Bank initiatives, for example. Yet public sector reforms remain less well analyzed than 
liberalization experiences. While some scholars suggest that reinvented public sector enterprises 
amount to a powerful alternative economic model that successfully solves older problems of 
state interference (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014), others argue they can never shake off their 
political masters to perform efficiently (Bremmer, 2010). This study shows that West Bengal’s 
public sector reforms brought striking initial gains, as did the surprisingly similar reform 
trajectories pursued by the state of Gujarat, yet the longer-term protection against political 
capture that they provided was real but limited.  
 Second, the study examines various explanations for West Bengal’s reform trajectory—
initial gains that plateaued—alongside India-wide regional variations in power reform success. 
While the comparative weakness of rural lobbies had some effect, it finds a more compelling 
explanation in the transition from one-party dominance to intensifying party-political 
competition. Prompted by fiscal pressures, West Bengal’s reforms were initiated under India’s 
longest-lived state-level administration, headed by the social-democratic Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) (CPI(M), governed 1977–2011). Later reform backsliding coincided with 
increasing competition from the left-populist Trinamool Congress, which displaced the CPI(M) 
in the state elections of 2011. Against developed-country theories which link party-political 
competition to improved democratic accountability,6 this study suggests at the Indian state level 
it is positively related to delivery of short-term, exclusive subsidies but inversely related to long-
term power governance. This analysis is again reinforced with evidence from other Indian states. 
High electoral volatility correlates with short-term usage of electricity as a political sop. 
Conversely, power reforms, which deliver visible benefits more slowly and often bring tariff 
rises for key constituencies in the short term, are linked to electoral stability and the increase in 
politicians’ time horizons it permits. However, power reforms are often motivated more by the 
drive to attract lucrative industry than to widen consumption, and so may not correspond with 
improved delivery of public services like health and education.  
 West Bengal’s power experience thus suggests the promise and limits of public sector 
reform as an alternative to liberalization, and the importance of party-political competition in 
conditioning reform trajectories. Section 2 provides a note on methodology. Section 3 outlines 
Indian and international experience with power sector liberalization, the dominant model to 
which West Bengal is contrasted. Section 4 documents West Bengal’s alternative, statist reform 
design, and assesses its success in improving power sector performance. Drawing on 
comparative evidence, Section 5 turns to consider the effects of party-political competition on 
                                                   
6 The most famous progenitor of this theory is Key (1949). 
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power reforms, and draws some tentative conclusions for the study of subnational development 
as stable electoral regimes emerge in several hitherto-underperforming Indian states. 
 
2. Methodology 
This research began as part of a comparative collaboration that aimed to provide a state-level 
perspective on electricity governance across 15 major Indian states, home to 87 percent (1.06 
billion people in 2011) of India’s population and thus providing broad if not representative 
coverage of the country. Our team of power specialists together developed a shared methodology 
designed to provide accounts as readily comparable as possible. This comprised, first, a shared 
quantitative evidence basis based on key economic and electricity sector indicators. Second, we 
drew up a list of interviewee categories (such as locally significant energy activist groups) from a 
review of the secondary literature. We then developed a regionally customizable template to 
provide a flexible starting point for semi-structured interviews. Questions focused especially on 
power sector performance, the reform process and its effects, and the politics of the distribution 
segment (for example, tariff setting or government–utility relations). 
 In accordance with this shared methodology, the author conducted 30 semi-structured 
interviews in West Bengal’s state capital, Kolkata, in July and August 2016. Interviewees were 
selected according to the preselected categories, with a preference for seniority where possible, 
facilitated by opportunistic “snowball”-style gathering of contacts. While the number of 
interviewees was comparatively small, with the obvious limitations that this entails, they 
included most of the key figures in West Bengal’s “reform team” (senior civil servants, 
consultants, electricity regulators, and donor agency officials) as well as representatives of other 
constituencies (former power ministers, energy bureaucrats, utility officials, regulators, consumer 
representatives, business associations, union representatives, academics, and journalists). 
Interviews varied from 30 minutes to two hours in length—the median length was one hour—on 
a not-for-attribution basis to encourage candor. This data was supplemented with qualitative 
observations from a regional “energy conclave” hosted by a nationwide business association; 
documentary sources, including national and state-level policy documents, consultancy reports, 
and media output; and quantitative evidence from official sources.  
 The research team shared their interview transcripts, documentary materials, and 
preliminary versions of their respective findings in order to provide a collective pool of material 
across the 15 states. Based on such comparison, West Bengal emerged as an interesting case in 
two different dimensions. First, against the broad international trend towards electricity 
liberalization, West Bengal was a deviant case: it pursued its own, locally derived reform path 
that foregrounded internal insulation in the context of retained public sector ownership. The 
relative success of this reform design, acknowledged by both the Government of India and the 
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World Bank (Ministry of Power, 2013; Pargal & Banerjee, 2014), suggests it deserves systematic 
documentation as an alternative to the liberalization model more prevalent—but often less 
successful—across much of the Global South.  
 Second, for the key variable of party-political competition West Bengal is a usefully 
extreme case: the CPI(M)-led Left Front was India’s longest-serving state administration, 
winning seven consecutive state assembly elections in a country otherwise famous for endemic 
anti-incumbency. Unrelated to its performance in the power domain (see below), the CPI(M) 
began to lose local elections from 2008 and was ejected from office in 2011. This sea-change in 
the state’s politics provides a window on the effects of a shift from one-party dominance to 
intensified party-political competition.  
This hypothesis is supported by comparison with other Indian states, and three in 
particular. First, Gujarat provides a “most-similar” case: it too has been characterized by one-
party dominance, governed by Chief Ministers from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since 1998. 
In the power sector both Gujarat and West Bengal were lauded as most-improved electricity 
performers in national and international indices, at least until 2014 (Ministry of Power, 2013; 
Pargal & Banerjee, 2014; see Table 1). This is surprising: wealthy, business-friendly Gujarat 
more often treated as a “most-different” case to poorer, nominally socialist West Bengal, given 
their divergent growth trajectories, governing political ideologies, and attitudes to the central 
government (Sinha, 2005). Second, comparison is made with the most-different cases of 
Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh, like West Bengal among India’s poorer states, but where electoral 
turnovers have been especially frequent—and power reform outcomes have been assessed as 
among India’s consistently worst. Together these cases, alongside briefer references to other 
major Indian states, provide a lens on the relationship between party-political competition and 
public service delivery.  
 
3. The frustrations of electricity liberalization 
The condition of the Indian power sector by the beginning of the 1990s mirrored the problems 
facing many developing countries (Victor & Heller, 2007). The industry was plagued by 
technical and financial underperformance, exacerbating chronic problems of underinvestment. 
Generation efficiency remained low and demand outstripped supply in many areas, leading to 
power rationing and blackouts. Tariffs for favored groups had become politicized: most Indian 
states subsidized agricultural and residential consumption, but failed to compensate their 
electricity boards—vertically integrated monopolies that handled generation, transmission, and 
distribution—for their lost revenue. Utilities were overmanned and widely regarded as 
extensions of the state bureaucracy. By 1991 cost recovery was only around 79 percent, and the 
situation looked increasingly untenable. 
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In 1991 the Government of India began “big-bang” economic reforms, with power 
generation the first major sector opened to private investment via independent power producers 
(IPPs). As in much of Asia, the IPP policy would prove ineffective at best (Dubash & Rajan, 
2001). It failed to provide much new generation capacity, and was linked to a series of 
scandalous deals, most notoriously Enron’s Dabhol plant in Maharashtra. The World Bank, then 
the sector’s biggest lender, argued that this simple “add-and-stir” approach to increasing 
generation left the deeper problems of the industry untouched.  
In the early 1990s, the Bank therefore fundamentally revised its approach to energy 
lending to encourage states to withdraw from involvement in day-to-day utility operations. 
Henceforth the Bank would lend only to Indian states that agreed to unbundle their vertically 
integrated electricity boards into separate generation, transmission, and distribution entities, 
facilitate private involvement in generation, and privatize distribution. Privatization was 
expected to bring in both new investment and, more crucially, a cultural change to tackle the 
problems of poor managerial selection and political patronage. Tariff adjustments were to be 
delegated to independent regulatory bodies, pluralistic forums where consumers and utilities 
alike could voice their interests. Eventually, market competition would force discipline upon the 
newly privatized and multiple power utilities. In this way the World Bank template offered a 
prescription to insulate utilities from government interference.  
 Elements of this template were gradually adopted across India. The first phase saw a 
series of state-level experiments, most famously in the poor eastern state of Odisha, an 
experience which sent foreign private investors fleeing from the Indian power sector and likely 
retarded rural electrification (Dubash & Rajan, 2001; Kale, 2014). The central government then 
gradually re-entered the fray, first legislating independent electricity regulators into existence and 
in 2000 with a comprehensive proposed Electricity Bill. With important local tweaks, 
independent regulation, unbundling, and especially competition remained pillars of the 
Electricity Act eventually passed in 2003. 
 In practice, the liberalization template—institutional restructuring, independent 
regulation, privatization, and competition—has only been partially applied in India. Although 
private firms now provide the largest share of power generated nationwide, only in Odisha, 
Delhi, and a handful of urban areas has distribution been privatized. Many Indian states have 
managed to thwart non-discriminatory “open access” to the grid for large private players, the key 
measure designed to improve competition and choice for both generation firms and consumers. 
In many, too, state-level electricity regulators have been quickly coopted by the executive and 
reabsorbed into the political systems they were designed to manage.  
 The results, as the introduction to this article suggested, have been correspondingly 
mixed. “The sector has come a long way,” a 2014 World Bank review cautiously noted, praising 
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the completion of the national grid, the extension of rural electrification, and the tripling of 
generation capacity (Pargal & Banerjee, 2014, xiii). “Overall, however, the potential of the sector 
remains unrealized,” both in terms of technical performance and financial sustainability. In the 
face of this persistent underperformance the onus of the reform prescription had shifted away 
from any fixed template. Instead, the Bank suggested that locally developed modes of reform 
“could… be beacons for others and are worthy of emulation” (ibid). It singled out West Bengal 
as such a “beacon,” albeit one quite different to the original power reform blueprint to which the 
Bank’s reputation had become tied.  
 
4. West Bengal’s alternative reform design: statist gradualism  
In contradistinction to the troubled liberalization template, this section outlines West Bengal’s 
distinctive reform design and evaluates its success. Driven by senior bureaucrats within the 
energy department and the public utility, the design aimed to maintain state ownership while 
mitigating its effects through institutional and technological mechanisms of insulation internal to 
the utility itself. The goal was to foster the utilities’ financial and operational independence from 
the government both at the apex and by “reducing the human element” in day-to-day operations. 
This alternative to liberalization, which shared surprising elements with the successful reforms 
undertaken by the very different state of Gujarat, produced striking short-term success that 
subsequently plateaued. 
 
(a) West Bengal’s diagnosis 
West Bengal appeared an unlikely reformer. It remained a poor, densely populated, nominally 
communist state with a long history of union activism and popular protest. As a result there was 
no powerful industrial constituency vocally demanding improved supply: West Bengal’s share of 
Indian factory production had declined from 30 percent at independence to less than 6 percent by 
the early 1990s. Nor did it appear likely to heed central calls for reform, traditionally taking an 
oppositional stance to New Delhi (Sinha, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the governing CPI(M) was more pragmatic than dogmatic, and West 
Bengal’s dire fiscal situation was becoming increasingly obvious. By the 1990s its state 
government debt burden was among India’s highest, worsened by a low tax collection ratio and 
the “communist premium” it paid to borrow. In 1994 Chief Minister Jyoti Basu (governed 1977–
2000) adopted a “new” liberal industrial policy and began to compete for private and foreign 
direct investment, a trend accelerated by his replacement, the reformist Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee 
(2000–2011). The Left Front regime shifted to prioritize industrial (and thus revenue) growth 
over its loyal rural base: “Agriculture Our Foundation, Industry Our Future,” as its 2006 election 
 9 
slogan ran. In this vision, the availability of cheap, abundant power would be West Bengal’s 
“USP [unique selling point].”7  
 Like the World Bank, West Bengal’s power reformers admitted that government 
intervention had negatively affected sector performance. Yet they rejected the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach of the liberalization template.8 Indeed, the reform process initiated in 2005 was 
explicitly informed by a months-long critique of previous reform failures in other Indian states 
by consultants who had seen these experiences first-hand.9 Even as financial exigencies provided 
the impetus for improved efficiencies in state-owned enterprises, the party’s nominally 
communist ideology encouraged reformers to “set aside” the most controversial elements of 
liberalization, “the ideological issues of the ‘two Ps’: pricing reforms and privatization.”10  
 
(b) The prescription: insulating public sector enterprises  
Instead the core of West Bengal’s reform model was to empower and upgrade the utilities 
themselves through improved and autonomous corporate governance and internal efficiencies. 
This had two key phases: (1) insulation at the apex, through the corporatization of management; 
and (2) insulation at the street level, by improving operational accountability. A key reformer 
explained the rationale:  
 
The first step was to isolate the utility—to the extent that the political economy allows—
from political interference. We never believed the government would be out of the sector 
entirely: that’s too optimistic given that the sector is government-owned and fulfills 
welfare goals. But we could keep it slightly at arm’s length. You can only do this if you 
assure the government that the sector will be run well, because politicians have two 
interests in the sector: (1) the quality of service, and (2) the efficiency of the customer 
interface. If you falter in either of these the political executive takes note... In any case, 
both power theft and political interference are often only excuses for inefficiency within 
the utility itself. So our efforts were driven by internal reforms. All other desirable ends, 
like good consumer management, follow from this improved accountability system.11  
 
The sine qua non was profitability, both to ensure financial independence from the government 
and to reassure politicians that the reforms were worthwhile.  
                                                   
7 Phone interview, donor agency official, August 3, 2016. All interviews were conducted by the author in and around 
Kolkata, India, unless noted otherwise.  
8 This phrase recurred both in interviews and in assessment exercises carried out at the time. 
9 Some had worked on power reforms as many as seven states; interview, consultant, August 18, 2016.  
10 Phone interview, donor agency official, August 3, 2016.  
11 Interview, former senior utility official, August 5, 2016. 
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 Unlike the World Bank template or 2003 Act, profitability was not to be guaranteed 
through competition. Unbundling was considered merely “cosmetic,” a means to streamline the 
utilities.12 Informed by difficulties experienced by several early-reforming states, the West 
Bengal team determined that multiple discoms made little sense without private competition: it 
would exacerbate the scarcity of managerial talent, create bureaucratic transfer issues, and make 
regional cross-subsidization more problematic. Accordingly, in 2007 the vertically integrated 
West Bengal State Electricity Board (WBSEB) was split into a transmission utility and a single 
discom, the West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL).13 The 
new utilities’ books were cleaned with a state government debt write-off, while WBSEB’s 
performance had also begun to improve before 2005. Reformers sought to leverage this to 
deliver visible improvements quickly, unlike the painful initial years that many states 
experienced. In this they were helped by the availability of fairly cheap power, enabling them to 
hold tariffs stable at first. While reforms in other Indian states and countries like Brazil were 
precipitated by crises, this indicates the value of acting in a moment of comparative fiscal 
breathing space rather than imminent collapse.  
 In place of competition, improved efficiency was to be guaranteed by imitating private 
sector conceptions of corporate governance. The key was “shadow listing:” drafting Articles of 
Association to comply with the recently published Clause 49, the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India agreement governing listing on the Indian stock exchange, without actual stockmarket 
flotation. This aimed to institutionalize an arm’s-length relationship with the government, 
notably through the introduction of genuinely independent directors recruited from top-tier 
executives across India. Board meetings became multi-hour inquisitions. Behind closed doors 
even the eventual possibility of divestment was discreetly considered, which would have 
reinforced the utilities’ independence from government even while providing a useful source of 
public revenues.14 
 Against the World Bank’s emphasis on importing independent electricity regulators to 
depoliticize tariff setting, the West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission (WBERC, created 
in 1999) remained supportive but secondary. Key policymakers remained wary of the 
fundamental risk of political capture within the system of “the regulation of government by 
government.”15 Nonetheless, in practice WBERC often proved strikingly pro-utility, at least 
while key officials in both institutions were aligned in their long-term vision. The regulator was 
instrumental in consistently revising tariffs upwards between 2007 and 2011, and aimed to be 
                                                   
12 Interview, former senior utility official, August 5, 2016.  
13 A separate generation entity had already existed since 1985.  
14 Interview, consultant, Gurgaon, Haryana, August 30, 2016.  
15 Phone interview, donor agency official, August 3, 2016; interview, former discom manager, August 5, 2016.  
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more light-touch and flexible than many other regulators, opting not to scrutinize every utility 
investment decision upfront but balancing the numbers annually.  
 WBERC also rejected the emphasis on civil society participation envisaged by the World 
Bank model of independent regulation. While the utilities enjoyed heavy representation on its 
advisory committee, around 2007 WBERC stopped holding public hearings, which tended to 
degenerate into “chaos,” instead taking only written submissions and soliciting responses directly 
from established groups. Surprisingly, some consumer groups endorsed this decision, feeling the 
public understands too little about electricity to contribute much except kneejerk resistance to 
even modest tariff rises; in any case, bar sporadic attention around tariff hikes, public and media 
interest in the sector generally remains low.16 When the utilities were functioning well between 
2007 and 2011, this technocratic compact with the regulator worked fairly smoothly, but 
WBERC was later reluctant to allow the discom to pass on the cost of political interference or 
inefficiencies to consumers (see below).  
 If the first phase of reforms focused on structure and apex-level management, the second 
focused on the workforce. Aware that unions had succeeded in blocking reforms in other states, 
the reformers adopted a gradualist, consensus-building approach. In an earlier effort to improve 
West Bengal’s precarious finances, a precedent had been set between 2000 and 2005 by the 
successful divestment—a euphemism for privatization—of “sick” public sector enterprises 
without significant labor opposition. The core personnel (both bureaucrats and 
PricewaterCoopers (PwC) consultants) for the power reforms assembled during this experience, 
which burnished their credibility. Several lessons would later be applied to electricity, not least 
the importance of devoting time to winning over unions and guaranteeing their pensions. 
Alongside this extensive internal stakeholder consultation, the decision was taken to keep a low 
media profile for as long as possible.17  
 Once employees were on board, the reformers turned to scrutinize business operations 
throughout the organization. Detailed job descriptions were drawn up to develop clear standards 
for performance monitoring. The bottom-heavy workforce was slimmed down, aided by a long 
recruitment freeze—between 2004 and 2016 the average employee age fell from 52 to 42—with 
the cooperation of engineers’ unions.18 Meanwhile the multi-layered administrative hierarchy 
was somewhat flattened through heavier reliance on outsourcing for tasks such as bill 
collection.19 Instead managers sought to attract a smaller number of high-quality technical staff 
                                                   
16 Interviews, consumer group, August 3, 2016; journalists, August 3 and 10, 2016.  
17 Interviews, former bureaucrat, August 11, and consultants, August 12 and 30, 2016; see also Lal (2010).  
18 “It was difficult for the bottom level of employees, but we understood the rationale,” explained an engineer union 
representative; “there has been a culture change against the earlier phase of resistance.” Interview, August 18, 2016. 
19 Interview, senior discom manager, August 18, 2016.  
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with some of the highest wages in the public sector, including the rare feat of hiring some 
specialists on contract. 
Already precociously computerized, WBSEDCL also opted for technology-aided 
solutions to “remove the human element,” a phrase which recurred throughout the interviews, or 
for tight monitoring where human interactions remained essential.20 Taking advantage of central 
funding for automation, bulk consumers and urban feeders were equipped with remotely 
readable meters, providing real-time data to improve billing and catch theft. Through these 
measures the reformers sought both to shrink the costly bureaucratic apparatus and improve its 
accountability. A third phase of reforms, intended to integrate business processes through 
software-aided resource planning, began to lag, however—a harbinger of the decline in 
administrative capacity to come.21 
 In line with the CPI(M)’s socialist public ideology, the result of West Bengal’s reform 
efforts remained conspicuously statist. Today transmission and most generation capacity (68 
percent) remains in the hands of the state generation company; this compares with 36 percent in 
Maharashtra, 33 percent in Andhra Pradesh, and 28 percent in Gujarat, all wealthier and 
considered more business-friendly.22 So too does distribution outside Kolkata and the Asansol–
Raniganj and Durgapur industrial belts. Open access to the wires by private generators with 
surplus power to sell, a cornerstone of the 2003 Electricity Act, was “allowed in theory, but not 
in practice.”23 Deeming it impossible due to the need to cross-subsidize mass consumption, 
utilities have thus so far successfully lobbied the regulator for very high “wheeling” charges to 
discourage elite consumer exit. This rejection is common across many Indian states, however, 
even those often most associated with liberalization. 
 Nonetheless, West Bengal’s reformers ruled out outright privatization on pragmatic 
grounds, not ideological. As the earlier privatization of PSEs and the willingness to debate 
eventual utility divestment suggest, debates around public versus private ownership were 
secondary to the desire for improved management and efficiency. The reformers incorporated 
management lessons drawn from the private sector and from pro-market critiques of the old style 
of public sector enterprise: the value of corporate governance norms, independent directors, 
independent consultancy and technology firms, and even lateral entry from the private sector for 
individual specialists (hitherto unthinkable in India’s seniority-driven bureaucracy). At the 
substation level key service delivery tasks were outsourced to private contractors, to the chagrin 
                                                   
20 For example, interview with former power minister, August 10, 2016.  
21 Interview, consultant, August 30, 2016. 
22 Central Electricity Authority data, September 2016. Since 2012 the West Bengal state’s share of power sales has 
declined, however, as despite its higher cost officials have been unwilling to renege on agreements with the central 
generator NTPC. Interviews, former utility manager, August 7, 2016, and former power minister, August 10, 2016.  
23 Interviews, former regulator, July 21, 2016, and regulator, August 12, 2016.  
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of some public sector employees.24 The result was thus a discreet hybrid, even while the visible 
trappings of public ownership were retained.25 
 
(c) The statist reform model as an alternative to liberalization 
Until 2010–11 the West Bengal model proved strikingly successful on several metrics, from 
financial performance to rural electrification. From annual losses of US$300 million in 2002, by 
2011 it had become one of only three states with (marginally) profitable discoms, with revenues 
more than covering the cost of supply without the need for substantial government subsidies 
(Table 1). Automation and improved vigilance saw T&D losses—often treated as a key indicator 
of utility efficiency and power theft—drop dramatically from around 40 percent in 2001 to a low 
of 23.2 percent in 2007–8, albeit a level still considerably higher than that achieved by Gujarat’s 
reformed utilities and one not sustained after 2009 (Figure 1).  
 The most dramatic improvement came in rural electrification. Drawing on a heavy central 
subsidy injection, the CPI(M) administration belatedly initiated rapid grid expansion. Between 
the 2001 and 2011 censuses the proportion of rural households using electricity as their primary 
light source doubled from 20.3 to 40.3 percent, with connections rising from 3.57 million to 8.57 
million. This still left West Bengal a laggard, but outperforming other major states with low 
levels of rural electrification. 
 Official indices recognized the scale of these achievements. In an extensive national 
review the World Bank singled West Bengal out as an example of best practice in utility 
governance and operational efficiency, a dramatic turnaround matched only by Gujarat (Pargal 
and Banerjee, 2014, 112–13). In the Government of India’s first formal assessment, WBSEDCL 
similarly received an “A” grade, behind only Gujarat’s four unbundled discoms (Ministry of 
Power, 2013; Table 1). As one World Bank manager wrote, West Bengal’s power sector thus 
offered an example of a “flawless reform programme, with important theoretical insights” (Lal, 
2010, 114). 
 
Figure 1. Initial gains trailing off: West Bengal state discom T&D losses, 2002–2016 
                                                   
24 WBSEDCL engineers have raised concerns about the weak oversight of substation-level outsourcing of tasks like 
billing, especially given its rapid rural expansion; there have been several cases of subcontractors taking money to 
deliver connections that never materialized. The third-phase software-based upgrading also relied heavily on Tata 
Consultancy Services, who controlled access to the system; WBSEDCL employees warned that this dependence 
risked becoming permanent and successfully petitioned for its transfer. Interviews, engineers’ union representative, 
August 18, 2016, and consumer group representative, August 3, 2016.  
25 For a larger-scale Indian example of reinvented public sector enterprises incorporating ideas about private-sector 
corporate governance, see Chatterjee (2017).   
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Source: WBSEB and WBSEDCL (unbundled discom) annual reports, various years26 
 
Table 1. West Bengal in comparative perspective: other select electricity indicators 
 West Bengal Gujarat Uttar Pradesh Jharkhand 
(1) Per capita electricity 
consumption (kWh, 2012) 
564 1663 450 790 
(2) Industrial consumption (%, 2015) 26.25 47.21 24.37 36.28 
[2013] 
(3) Industrial revenue (%, 2015) 31.73 62.15 39.85 54.35 
(4) Rural household electrification 
(%, 2001) 
20.30 72.10 19.80 10.00 
(5) Rural household electrification 
(%, 2016) 
92.00 93.70 30.41 36.67 
(6) Subsidy to discoms (Rs millions, 
2015) 
0 11,010 98,030 21,120 
(7) Discom rating,* (2013) A A+, A+, 
A+, A+ 
C+, C, C, C, C C+ 
* After unbundling states may have more than one distribution company, hence multiple ratings.  
Sources: (1) Planning Commission (2014: 18); (2), (3), (6) Power Finance Corporation (2016); (4) 2001 
Census of India; (5) West Bengal and Gujarat data from National Family Health Survey, Jharkhand and 
Uttar Pradesh data from Government of India Garv portal; (7) Ministry of Power (2013).  
 
                                                   
26 T&D loss data vary from source to source and are notoriously unreliable, as suggested by the fact that around 
2000 losses abruptly rose India-wide not as the result of increased theft but more accurate data collection. This 
figure should only be used to visualize broad trends. 
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 The strength of hybrid, statist reforms like West Bengal’s, in contrast to outright 
liberalization, is also attested by the striking similarities found in a very different state, Gujarat, 
typically treated as a dramatic contrast to West Bengal (Sinha, 2005). While West Bengal is an 
industrial laggard with administrations publically ambivalent to both economic liberalization and 
central initiatives, wealthy Gujarat is India’s most iconically industry-friendly state and has been 
governed by the rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for the past two decades. Yet power 
reforms in “pro-business” Gujarat have as much in common with Bengali statism as the World 
Bank template. Like Bengal, Gujarat’s successful reform process concentrated on improving 
utility autonomy through financial restructuring, process streamlining, and technological fixes. In 
both states civil society engagement in the regulatory process has taken a backseat to upgraded 
management capacity. Meanwhile, both resisted the most controversial elements of liberalization 
such as open access, and avoided direct confrontation with unions in favor of a gradualist 
approach that sought to win over public utility employees (Madhavan, 2012).  
 Despite their ideological differences, West Bengal and Gujarat thus appear to offer two 
different iterations of a technocratic alternative to the World Bank template’s emphasis on market 
competition via privatization, independent regulation, and civil society participation. The two 
states’ focus on management rather than ownership appears prescient in the wake of 
liberalization’s high-profile failures in other states. In Odisha, the pioneering privatizer where 
power reforms were loudly publicized, each of the four distribution companies is now back in 
public hands. In the huge northern state of Uttar Pradesh, frequently cited as a cautionary tale by 
West Bengal’s reformers, the creation of five discoms and two abortive attempts at privatization 
have failed to improve the utilities’ dismal financial and operational performance. In the face of 
the liberalization template’s failures, the two states together show the sustainability of taking a 
pragmatic, gradualist approach to win over powerful interest groups like engineers’ unions while 
avoiding the most politically controversial aspects of liberalization. These cases suggest that 
successful change in the sector has relied on bolstering public utilities rather than merely 
demolishing them. They show the potential gains offered by gradualist reforms directed more at 
improved public sector governance than the controversial prescription for privatization of the 
liberalization model. 
 
(d) The difficulty of sustaining performance improvements 
Nonetheless, reforms in West Bengal came at a high political cost. The Left Front had banked 
heavily on the hope that improving the investment climate, including through reliable electricity, 
would bring dividends. But improved power performance came too late to prevent the popular 
backlash against the CPI(M)’s pro-industrial reforms. Its apex-led, technocratic governance style 
may have begun to deliver in the power sector, but the general pro-industry and top-down tilt 
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over local responsiveness—“smug unilateralism,” in one commentator’s phrase (Bhattacharyya, 
2016, 207)—came at the cost of the CPI(M)’s overall moral and political credibility. By 2008 
more than half of Bengali villages would be in opposition hands, and in the 2009 national 
elections the party lost two-thirds of its Lok Sabha seats (Table 2; see below). In the 2011 
election, after 34 years in office, the Left Front government was dismissed from power in favor 
of Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress.  
The decline in the CPI(M)’s electoral fortunes coincided with a decline in utility 
performance that calls into question the reforms’ longer-term sustainability. Upon taking office 
new Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee felt she had little choice but to block tariff revisions 
despite misgivings: “Do not talk to me about tariffs,” she instructed her staff.27 Delays to tariff 
hikes would recur before the most recent state election in 2016. Meanwhile, after their earlier 
steep fall, T&D losses had begun to climb again as early as 2009 and continued to rise (Figure 
1). The revived political pressure was often indirect: “I never received a phone call from the 
chief minister or anything like that,” explained one former regulator. Instead, both WBSEDCL 
and the private CESC “voluntarily” moderated their tariff petitions before elections.28 This was 
exacerbated by a widely perceived decline in the quality of personnel, virtually as a matter of 
policy in order to make the agencies more tractable.29 The regulator was left with only one 
member and without a chairman for almost two years, though during this time it fought a 
rearguard action against institutional decline (see below). A senior bureaucrat admitted: “The 
utilities are not at all independent. We are poking them at least eight times a day, eight hours a 
day.”30 
As a result of these trends, since 2011 WBSEDCL’s finances have rapidly deteriorated. 
Belated tariff hikes could not keep pace with the increasing cost of employee salaries, interest 
payments, or power procurement. WBSEDCL increasingly resorted to short-term borrowing to 
finance even everyday operations; its credit rating was downgraded as a result.  
 Nonetheless, signs of reform resilience within the bureaucracy remained. As 
WBSEDCL’s losses began to mount in the Trinamool administration’s first months, the original 
reformers mobilized to intervene via the Chief Minister’s trusted lieutenants. They warned that 
power cuts would hit key school examinations, an event of major cultural significance in West 
Bengal, and even permitted limited cuts to begin to illustrate the situation’s seriousness.31 After 
long consideration, Banerjee agreed to tariff revisions and nominally foreswore further political 
interference. Reformers saw this as a victory for long-term thinking, although it suggests that 
                                                   
27 Interviews, former senior power officials, August 5 and 11, 2016. 
28 Interviews, former regulator, July 31, 2016; regulator, August 12, 2016.  
29 Personal communication, former power official, August 11, 2016; interview, regulator, August 12, 2016.  
30 Interview, August 19, 2016.  
31 Interview, former senior discom official, August 4, 2016. 
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reform sustainability has relied on the personal commitment and authority of individuals rather 
than institutionalized checks.  
The regulator, WBERC, has also provided a source of modest resistance, despite attempts 
to degrade its operations. It took a stand on the issue of “regulatory assets,” alleging that 
WBSEDCL’s marginal on-paper profits in recent years relied on misclassifying a significant sum 
stemming from discom inefficiencies—creative accounting that also prompted a respected 
discom board member to resign. Even discom staff appear to have internalized reformed 
professional norms. Managers still envisage their enterprise as “a professionally managed 
organization, not a government entity,” even if they remain realistic about the negotiated 
character of their independence.32  
Nor has political interference been as heavy-handed as in some other states. Officials still 
generally serve out their tenures and tariff rises have belatedly occurred. In any case, it is 
possible to overstate the contrast with the CPI(M): power theft was already rising again before 
2011 (Figure 1) and still remains below pre-reform levels. West Bengal’s deterioration is thus 
only relative. As one reformer argued: “From the outset we always had doubts about 
sustainability. It’s true that the sector is not at the level it rose to, but it is considerably better than 
the level that we started at.”33 The public sector reform model thus provided some, albeit limited, 
protection against renewed political interference. The following section seeks to explain this 
performance trajectory—dramatic initial gains that subsequently plateaued—and the light it 
sheds on the political preconditions and constraints on (sustained) reform success.  
 
5. Party-political competition and power reforms 
A variety of explanations for regional variation in power reforms within India have been offered, 
from the varying strength of rural or industrial lobbies to the level of economic development. 
Examining West Bengal’s experience alongside comparative evidence from other states, this 
section posits instead that electoral (in)stability has a determining effect. Specifically, 
intensifying party-political competition leads to shorter political time horizons and thus 
decreased electricity performance, inhibiting power reforms in particular. Conversely, one-party 
dominance can open a window of opportunity for power reforms by permitting state leaders to 
take a longer-term perspective. This leaves the puzzle of why some politicians might forego 
short-term electoral rewards for more uncertain longer-term gains. The section concludes by 
exploring the factors that determine whether and when political leaders opt to initiate reform. 
These factors vary from state to state, but have interesting implications for the interaction 
between political stability and development priorities. 
                                                   
32 Interviews, senior discom manager, August 18, 2016; donor agency official, August 3, 2016. 
33 Interview, former senior discom official, August 5, 2016.  
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(a) Explanations of electric divergence 
The varying pace of power reforms across Indian states presents a puzzle. It is not simply a 
matter of widening divergence between high and low economic performers (Kochhar et al., 
2006): some states that are otherwise comparatively wealthy and industry-friendly have power 
sectors characterized by huge financial losses and frequent power outages, as in the case of Tamil 
Nadu. Nor is it enough that a powerful industrial lobby exists, clamoring for reform (Pedersen, 
2000). West Bengal reformed despite the absence of a powerful industry presence, due to both its 
nominally socialist ideology and historical accident: since colonial times Kolkata and the state’s 
coal-rich industrial belts had been monopolized by utilities outside the state government’s 
control, so there existed only a shrunken industrial constituency to demand power reforms. As 
shown by West Bengal’s bold reforms under the CPI(M) and their surprising similarity to those 
in pro-business Gujarat, governing ideology (Kapur, 2004) also struggles to explain this 
variation. 
 The most influential explanation posits that farmer lobbies, typically enjoying heavily 
subsidized electricity access, are the “winners” from the present system and so have blocked 
power reforms in the states where they are most powerful (a thesis most forcefully expounded in 
Kale, 2014). With powerful farmer lobbies, wealthy Punjab and Tamil Nadu found agricultural 
subsidies politically impossible to dismantle and never seriously considered electricity reforms. 
Most strikingly, the 2004 electoral defeat of perhaps India’s most vocal liberalization advocate, 
Chandrababu Naidu, in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh was widely regarded as the result of 
his attempts to cut agricultural power subsidies; within hours of taking office his replacement 
immediately granted free power to farmers (Kale, 2014, 151–70). In contrast, the early pioneer 
Odisha had an unusually weak base of rural electrification, while the only other territory to 
privatize distribution, Delhi, was unusually urban.  
 West Bengal provides some support for this hypothesis: its weak farmer lobbies and 
belated rural electrification meant it escaped becoming locked in to expensive agricultural 
subsidies. The reason was in part geological—its wet climate meant that agrarian irrigation was 
less of a priority than in drier regions—and in part a response to the absence of lucrative 
industrial consumers to cross-subsidize rural electrification. CPI(M) policies also inadvertently 
helped to prevent the emergence of powerful farmer lobbies. The party’s famous land reforms 
created an agrarian class with significantly smaller holdings than their counterparts elsewhere, 
while the CPI(M)’s disciplined organizational structure also helped to head off rural pressure 
(Bhattacharyya, 2016, 123–154). Overall agricultural consumption remains low (less than 10 
percent of connected loads), and West Bengal’s power sector thereby largely escaped the 
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problem of low agricultural tariffs that plagued southern and western states. This rural neglect 
would later facilitate power reforms unthinkable in many other states (Mukherji, 2006). 
 Nonetheless, comparative evidence suggests this was a useful but not a sufficient 
precondition for reform. Jharkhand has struggled to reform its power sectors despite also having 
low agricultural load. Meanwhile Gujarat, India’s most widely acknowledged electricity success 
story, managed to reform despite its powerful farmers’ associations. Kale notes that Gujarat’s 
experience shows that the farmer lobby thesis is “conditional,” and “disciplined party and 
bureaucratic structures can successfully dismantle a prevailing order” (2014, 162). The following 
analysis suggests that varying levels of party-political competition provide a valuable 
supplement to the rural lobby thesis, helping to explain when state-level politicians will or will 
not take on powerful coalitions of potential reform “losers.” 
 


















Seat share (%) 48.6 61.9 59.9 21.4 13.6 4.8 8.8 
Vote share (%) 36.6 38.6  37.1  33.1  30.1 23.0 19.8 
Trinamool 
Seat share (%) 20.4 2.4 10.2 45.2 62.6 81.0 71.8 
Vote share (%) 30.7 21.0 26.6 31.1 38.9 39.8 44.9 
Results from the Election Commission of India, http://eciresults.nic.in/   
 
(b) Party-political competition and power reform outcomes 
The trajectory of West Bengal’s electricity sector since 2000, a precocious local reform model 
offering striking initial gains which subsequently tailed off, provides a useful window on the 
interaction of party-political competition and power reforms. A post-poll voter survey found that 
the CPI(M) was voted out not because of its governance record—in fact, the improved electricity 
supply was popular—but for betraying its pro-poor ideology, most notoriously through coercive 
state land acquisition for industrial projects at Nandigram and Singur in 2007 (Bhattacharyya, 
2016, 224). This suggests that the changing level of party-political competition was exogenous to 
the transformation of the power sector itself.  
 Crucial for facilitating West Bengal’s power reforms was the one-party dominance of the 
CPI(M), which governed for 34 years until 2011. In its reform efforts the CPI(M) was able to 
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draw on its unique organizational strength and the durability of its class coalition, bolstered by a 
system of local clientelism. It was a well-disciplined, cadre-based organization with a centralized 
hierarchy that vested substantial power in the Chief Minister. The regime also benefited from 
tight links with the senior bureaucracy, fostered in part by its sheer longevity: key power 
reformers later described a process of “negotiation” with a receptive apex, in which they well 
understood how best to couch their suggestions to appeal to long-serving politicians.34 
Nonetheless, the CPI(M) system was far from a Weberian bureaucracy. Despite never 
winning more than half of all votes, its domination at the state level was near absolute. Its grip at 
the grassroots relied on formal decentralization through the panchayati raj system of local 
government, introduced almost as soon as it took office, and on a grassroots system of patronage 
and dispute arbitration. The CPI(M)’s success therefore rested on the party’s ability to mediate 
between these two levels: the “elevated” domain of centralized, top-down policymaking and the 
“embedded” domain of dispersed, everyday clientelism, especially among poor voters in rural 
areas (Bhattacharyya, 2016).  
Together this centralized decision-making, bureaucratic embeddedness, and popular 
clientelism helped to inform a distinctive mode of reforms. The CPI(M)’s political domination 
and hierarchical state-party apparatus gave the Chief Minister the latitude and authority to push 
for major policy change with the eventual goal of industrialization. Yet, if the embeddedness of 
the party-state provided the CPI(M)’s influence, reformists also argued that it risked hollowing 
out official institutions. Bhattacharjee publicly acknowledged that corruption and high-
handedness among local satraps and bureaucrats was becoming a serious concern 
(Mukhopadhyay, 2001). This pushed the regime to attempt to restrict the influence and 
“embeddedness” of the party-state, especially its lower apparatus. Insulation was therefore a key 
priority, shaping the distinctive statist reforms outlined in Section 4.  
 Nonetheless, West Bengal’s power reforms could not sustain momentum as party-
political competition intensified after the Left Front’s local election defeats in 2008 (Table 2). In 
2011 the Trinamool Congress swept to a majority, winning over much of the Left Front’s hitherto 
resilient base of sharecroppers and small cultivators alongside its older support among the urban 
lower-middle classes and small businesses. Yet the Trinamool regime faced quite different 
political challenges. While the CPI(M)’s longevity had given its leadership the (perhaps 
misplaced) confidence that it could take long-term decisions, the new administration was 
conscious that it was operating in a formidably competitive political space. Nor did new Chief 
Minister Mamata Banerjee instantly trust the senior bureaucracy, given its long association with 
the patrician CPI(M) elite. The combination of a base among the “intermediate classes”—rural 
                                                   
34 Interviews, former senior power sector officials, August 5 and 11, 2016.  
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smallholders and the petty bourgeoisie—and fierce competition for votes helped to shape its 
populist stance towards the power sector.  
 For much of Trinamool’s first term it accordingly prioritized pro-poor expansion through 
both informal and formal channels. On the one hand rural electrification has accelerated still 
more dramatically. By the 2015–16 one survey alleged this had leapt to 92 percent (Table 1), and 
officials believed 100 percent household electrification to be imminent. On the other, the 
government apex has at least indirectly pressured the utilities and regulator to delay tariff rises 
around elections, undermining a core pillar of utility independence.  
 Moreover, Trinamool is not the disciplined machine that the CPI(M) was, for all its flaws. 
United by opposition to the CPI(M) rather than a coherent platform, and virtually synonymous 
with Mamata Banerjee, it is more weakly coordinated. The reformers thus “realized that there are 
problems that Mamata cannot control; political will won’t stretch downwards to solving 
problems of disconnections or theft.”35 Since 2011 T&D losses have begun to climb again at a 
rate that cannot be attributed solely to technical losses from expanded rural electrification 
(Figure 1). In several areas police are reportedly refusing to intervene against power theft, and 
many interviewees now characterize the power sector’s problems as a law-and-order issue. Given 
that elsewhere in India tolerance of theft has been shown to be politically driven (Min & Golden, 
2014), this might be considered an informal power subsidy distributed by local satraps as they 
attempted to dislodge the CPI(M)’s hitherto robust rural party-machine, with some success. If 
one-party dominance facilitated West Bengal’s power reform efforts, then, an intensification of 
party-political competition led to reform backsliding.  
 A somewhat similar pattern can be seen in Delhi, which opted for a locally developed 
program of unbundling and privatization under the stable Congress administration of Sheila 
Dikshit, Chief Minister from 1998 to 2013. This brought performance improvements, notably in 
reducing T&D losses, but at the cost of unpopular higher residential tariffs and mounting 
regulatory assets (an accounting euphemism for unrecovered dues). The dramatic electoral rise of 
the anti-corruption Aam Admi Party in a short-lived minority administration (2013), a period of 
President’s Rule by the center (2014), and a majority administration (from 2015) has brought the 
populist politicization of tariffs and back-and-forth contests between the administration, 
regulator, and courts. As in West Bengal, intensifying party-political competition has undermined 
power reforms—though in Delhi electricity itself has become a key electoral issue. 
The other top electricity reform performer, Gujarat, enjoyed a similar combination of 
electoral dominance and a highly disciplined subnational regime. In the 1990s, its electricity 
board faced an unpropitious combination of tight finances and an unfavorable load balance: 
                                                   
35 Interview, former power official, August 11, 2016. 
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industry in 1999–2000 comprised only 29 percent of consumption, similar to West Bengal’s 
figure today (Table 1), while agriculture’s share stood at 48 percent and went unmetered (though 
this was likely an exaggeration concealing some power theft). Two-party competition between 
the Congress and BJP gave way in 1998 to an unbroken period of BJP rule, facilitating reforms 
in spite of the state’s powerful farmer lobby. Under Narendra Modi (governed 2001–2014), like 
Bhattacharjee a reform-minded Chief Minister heading a centralized administration, Gujarat 
pursued a successful power reform program that balanced winning over employee unions with a 
similar emphasis on ensuring utility independence, albeit with greater private participation in 
generation (Section 4). Unlike West Bengal, its one-party dominance for the moment continues, 
and with it the state’s robust electricity performance. 
 Conversely, the worst performing utilities are concentrated in states with intense party-
political competition. In the giant state of Uttar Pradesh, multi-party competition between the 
BJP, Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, and Congress has led multiple single-term political 
administrations to repeatedly initiate consultations on the prospect of power reform, only to back 
down and opt for populist compromises once again. Non-industrial tariffs remain well below the 
cost of recovery, as politicians seek to avoid any reduction in subsidies for numerically powerful 
groups like farmers and weavers. T&D losses remain higher than West Bengal’s, as they prove 
reluctant to crack down on theft channeled to key constituencies (Min & Golden, 2014).  
 The coal-rich eastern state of Jharkhand presents an even more extreme case of party-
political tumult: it has seen ten chief ministers and two periods of President’s Rule in 15 years. In 
this setting politicians’ time horizons appear still further constrained. Rather than even opting for 
populist buy-offs, let alone long-term planning, parties and coalitions in power have opted to 
extract rents from the large, capital-intensive projects that characterize the power system.36 As a 
result Jharkhand’s village and household electrification levels are among the lowest in the 
country, while its utility has wrestled with mounting losses.  
 This pattern is not confined to these two notoriously low-performing states or where 
competition is two-party rather than multiparty. Electricity in Rajasthan, where the BJP and 
Congress have alternated in power since 1990, remains plagued by low tariffs, high theft, and 
heavy financial losses. Even states which otherwise perform significantly better than West 
Bengal on most development indicators have struggled with power reform. Comparatively 
wealthy Punjab, now in a three-way electoral contest, has seen waves of populist competition to 
extend power subsidies (Birner et al., 2011: 108–129). Most strikingly, the two political parties 
that alternate in power in Tamil Nadu compete to offer increasingly extensive and expensive 
subsidies, throwing the state utility into financial disarray, despite the fact that it is often 
                                                   
36 I thank Rohit Chandra for this observation. 
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considered one of India’s most industrially successful states. It thus appears that party-political 
competition and power reforms interact across many Indian states. 
 
(c) Electricity, electoral competition, and political time horizons 
The introduction noted that influential theories of democratic accountability, largely derived 
from the study of affluent societies, hold that party-political competition makes politicians more 
responsive and likely to deliver collective goods, amongst which electricity is often included 
(Key, 1949; see Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 1–2). Some have applied related arguments to 
India (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Singh, 2016, 229).  
 Scholarship on Indian electricity challenges this benign interpretation, however, instead 
emphasizing the problem of time inconsistency. The incentives for long-term investments do not 
perfectly align with the time horizons of democratic politicians: they may not offer visible 
benefits until far into the future. Democratic politicians’ concern with reelection “induc[es] an 
emphasis on maximizing short-term gains”—highly visible village electrification or streetlight 
installation schemes, for example—“and away from the kind of long-term investments that 
require fiscal sacrifices in the present,” such as maintenance and new generation capacity (Min, 
2015, 33). Against the developed-country theory that party-political competition improves 
service delivery, this study’s findings support existing India-derived arguments that high 
electoral volatility correlates with short-term usage of electricity as a political sop (Min, 2015; 
Chhibber & Nooruddin, 2004).  
Yet the present study also suggests a controversial extension, providing evidence that the 
inverse might also be true: one-party dominance in democratic systems may permit longer 
political time horizons. In contrast to short-term subsidies that aim to secure the support of key 
voting blocs, power reforms aimed at fiscal and technical sustainability require longer time 
horizons and offer fewer immediately visible benefits to voters. In fact, reforms of the type 
documented here are counterintuitive: not only do they risk alienating powerful constituencies 
who would see their tariffs rise, but the decision to insulate utilities from political interference 
restricts politicians’ control of rents. 
When and why do politicians change their horizons in this way, tying their hands on the 
distribution of short-term patronage in the hope of securing long-term advantage? This is a 
question that deserves further research, but we can draw out some speculative threads from the 
preceding analysis.  
One-party dominance is not sufficient to secure improved power performance. West 
Bengal under the CPI(M) in the years after 1977 has been seen as India’s archetypal “social-
democratic” regime (Kohli, 2012), but despite its nominally socialist ideology the Left Front 
government did little to deliver high-quality power or mass electrification until the 2000s. The 
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2001 census recorded a rural household electrification rate of only 20.3 percent, well below the 
all-India average of 43.5 percent. Its persistent neglect of rural electrification illuminates the 
shallowness of the CPI(M)’s agrarian and pro-poor reforms in practice. This is arguably the cost 
of its assured grip on power for so long, under a leadership dominated by urban, educated, upper-
caste elites (Kale, 2014, 170–5)—and might be seen to reinforce the theory that party-political 
competition brings democratic accountability. 
What sparked the turn to power reforms in the early 2000s, then? If they can outlast 
short-term electoral backlashes, improved electricity offers politicians the prospect of long-term 
advantages, a theory reinforced by interview evidence. Improved electricity—both power 
reforms as a pro-industry signal and reliable power as an industrial input—can help to attract 
large industry, now an increasingly crucial source of government and utility revenues, political 
legitimacy through employment creation, and (less benignly) of the economic rents that provide 
Indian politicians with the vast resources they require to run for reelection. In West Bengal the 
decision was perhaps especially stark. While its power sector was not itself in crisis when 
reforms began, overall it was the most heavily indebted of Indian states. By the early 2000s its 
rapid agricultural growth had begun to taper off, forcing it to look for an alternative, pro-industry 
strategy to mobilize new rents, despite the ruling party’s hitherto publicly anti-capitalist 
ideology. Ruling parties with less ideological baggage, like the BJP in Gujarat, could embrace 
this calculus still more easily.37 
 This analysis points in both positive and negative directions. For West Bengal, it may be 
encouraging. In 2016 Trinamool returned to office with an even more decisive mandate (Table 
2), supported by mass defections of CPI(M) local cadres. The decisive confirmation of five more 
years in power and the collapse of the CPI(M) vote may mark at least a temporary end to the 
period of intense party-political competition, and so increase the political leadership’s perceived 
latitude for long-term decision-making. In theory, then, the administration will be more likely to 
move away from short-term sops and towards a more ambitious development agenda. This is 
especially true as the same structural exigencies that impelled the CPI(M)’s break with its pro-
poor ideology begin to bite once more. As in the 2000s, the drive for industrialization and private 
investment has again become paramount to provide jobs and, not least, to burnish government 
revenues. West Bengal’s debt-to-GSDP ratio remains the worst of any major state and interest 
                                                   
37 Even more interesting is the case of Karnataka, where fierce party-political competition has not stopped a 
bipartisan consensus emerging on the necessity of regular tariff hikes alongside redistribution between state utilities. 
Something similar could be said of Odisha’s initial, bipartisan decision to liberalize power in the early 1990s. Under 
what conditions does such cross-party consensus on development priorities emerge? Singh (2016) explains such 
consensus on social policy as the result of strong subnational solidarity, but the patterns she detects do not hold for 
the case of electricity.  
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payments eat up more than a fifth of its revenue expenditure.38 Trinamool has thus rehabilitated 
the CPI(M)’s old hope: that quality electricity can lure in revenue-boosting industry, which 
bolsters the case to avoid political interference in utility operations or tariff setting.39 Some 
within the administration have even suggested that electricity cross-subsidies could be dropped 
altogether.40 In this way the imagined constituency of future industry chases out the use of 
electricity as a “sop” for existing interest groups, the focus of scholarly analyses to date. 
 The prioritization of electric development over electric sops is reinforced by a body of 
political science literature which suggests that rising consumer expectations may encourage a 
shift away from short-term clientelism to rewarding more sustained and programmatic “good 
governance” (Wilkinson, 2007).41  Indeed, such shifting goalposts gave rise to a common 
complaint among CPI(M) leaders and cadres, reported one anthropologist: “bostey diley chutey 
chai [if you invite them to sit down, they want to lie down]” (Banerjee, 2010, 250). Especially in 
urban areas, as the quality of service rose so did increased consumer expectations and sensitivity 
to even short disruptions. With 100 percent household electrification imminent, power sector 
officials widely acknowledge that policy objectives must shift from basic provision to quality of 
supply. Efficient management will therefore become a rising priority. 
 Less positively, the rewards that politicians may expect from taking a longer-term view of 
the power sector do not always materialize in practice. If Chandrababu Naidu’s 2004 ejection 
from office in Andhra Pradesh indicated the perils of alienating key constituencies by trimming 
short-term benefits, the example of the CPI(M) shows that even public recognition of successful 
power reforms is not sufficient to guarantee reelection. More than this, power reforms do not 
alone provide the silver bullet to draw in lucrative industry. West Bengal’s plateauing power 
consumption—like many other states it now nominally enjoys a power surplus as demand 
growth has failed to keep pace with projections—suggests that its failure to attract industry has 
persisted even into the era of improved power supplies. Industrialists and others instead call for 
other policy shifts, especially around land acquisition and other infrastructural bottlenecks.42 
Without such rich cross-subsidizing consumers the power sector’s future itself now lies in doubt. 
As one interviewee evocatively asked: “Can an island of excellence survive where everything 
                                                   
38 Figures from Niti Aayog, http://niti.gov.in/state-statistics (last accessed October 20, 2016). The administration has 
therefore resisted signing onto the centre’s Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) financial restructuring scheme, 
as this would simply heap the discom’s debts upon the state government’s own distressed books.  
39 Interview, regulator, August 12, 2016.  
40 Interviews, former discom manager, August 7, 2016, and senior power bureaucrat, August 19, 2016.  
41 Surveying rural Bengal, Bardhan et al. (2009) already found that providing one-time benefits did not succeed in 
winning voter loyalty, while recurring benefits and broad-based changes did.  
42 Now that reliability has improved, industrialists do not consider electricity a primary issue; interview, industry 
lobbyist, August 8, 2016.  
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else sucks?”43 If the long-term benefits seem so uncertain, politicians may either further hesitate 
before embarking on power reforms, or determine that they will succeed only in the context of a 
broader pro-industry policy turn.  
 The latter point raises an ominous caveat about the relationship between party-political 
competition and public service delivery. Some of India’s poorest states now have comparatively 
stable administrations under long-lasting Chief Ministers, including Madhya Pradesh (Shivraj 
Singh Chouhan, since 2005), Chhattisgarh (Raman Singh, since 2003), Odisha (Naveen Patnaik, 
since 2000), and Bihar (Nitish Kumar, since 2005, with a short break). Such electoral stability 
ought to facilitate power reforms in these states—as is indeed gradually occurring, in contrast to 
Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand.  
This study has also suggested, however, that power reforms are often motivated more by 
the drive to attract lucrative industry than to increase access or affordability. Indeed, for poor 
governments, the choice to extend electricity to new groups unable to pay the full cost of supply 
is an expensive one that may further imperil their utilities’ already precarious finances and so 
discourage industrial investment. This is directly visible in Madhya Pradesh, where huge 
capacity additions have improved power quality for existing consumers and the state government 
hopes to sell on a surplus, but access and affordability remain low or have even declined. More 
optimistically, after popular protests in 2011, Bihar has embarked on an ambitious program of 
power reform and household electrification, albeit one reliant on continually low power prices 
and heavy state subsidies. This suggests a mixed picture for India going forward. Power reforms 
under one-party dominance may not correspond with improved delivery of public services like 
health and education. While one-party subnational regimes may offer more effective and long-
termist industrial development, the very precondition of their success undermines the move 
towards a more accountable and democratic human developmental state. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has used evidence from the understudied case of West Bengal to shed light on power 
sector underperformance, which persists across much of the Global South despite years of reform 
efforts. Elsewhere these reforms have often taken the form of liberalization, but West Bengal’s 
locally developed design presents a useful alternative model of reforms under reinvented state 
ownership. Aimed at internally strengthening the utility against political interference despite the 
utility’s public sector status, this model delivered striking short-term gains that subsequently 
tailed off, while continuing to offer some resistance to political capture. Successful reforms in 
Gujarat, typically analyzed as quite different to West Bengal, were also more statist and 
                                                   
43 Phone interview, donor agency official, August 3, 2016.  
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gradualist than often recognized. Given the political obstacles to power sector liberalization and 
examples of its dramatic failures across Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, such 
alternatives deserves serious attention by power policymakers and donor agency officials alike.  
 Second, West Bengal’s reform trajectory was used alongside comparative evidence from 
other Indian states to test explanations of the political preconditions for power reform success. 
While the comparative weakness of rural lobbies had some effect, the article found a compelling 
explanation in the transition from one-party dominance to intensifying party-political 
competition. In contrast to influential political theories developed in the Global North, this 
suggests that party-political competition does not make Indian politicians more likely to deliver 
public services, but rather leads to short-termism and political capture of utilities. Conversely, 
under some conditions one-party dominance in democratic systems can encourage longer-term 
reforms. It may not bring about improvements in basic public services, however: electric welfare 
gains have often been mere side-effects of the new priority accorded to industry, as confirmed by 
persistently poor health and education outcomes in some of the same states that have made 
belated improvements. The study thus assesses the promise and limits of public sector reforms as 
an alternative to the increasingly unpopular global liberalization template, and provides a fresh 
perspective on the relationship between democratic competition and developmentalism in 
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